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Research Highlights for “Multipart Tariffs and Bounded Rationality: An 
Experimental Analysis of Mobile Phone Plan Choices”, by Lana Friesen and Peter E. 
Earl
 We study consumer decisions involving complex multiple-part tariffs
 We develop a stylized experiment involving mobile phone plan choices
 Multipart tariffs with increasing marginal usage costs lead to the worst decisions
 Knowledge of pricing schemes leads to better decisions
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Abstract
Multipart tariff structures add to the computational challenges in choosing mobile phone 
connection services. We study the quality of decision making in a laboratory environment 
where consumers only face a small set of mobile phone plan options but have to contend 
with different degrees of tariff complexity as well as uncertain usage. Our main finding is that 
simply eliminating the multipart tariff structure does not necessarily lead to better decisions. 
Rather it is multipart tariffs with included values in excess of monthly fees, thus entailing 
two-tier pricing structures with increasing marginal costs, which lead to the worst decisions.  
Knowledgeable participants, who understand mobile phone plan pricing, make significantly 
better choices.
Keywords: complexity, laboratory experiments, mobile phone pricing, nonlinear pricing, 
cellular
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1. Introduction
Businesses have long experience of multipart pricing arrangements in which marginal 
costs rise discontinuously once usage rates hit a particular level. Such arrangements are 
common for large customers in sectors such as electricity supply, where peak load spikes 
impose major costs on suppliers. They are also common with supplies of working capital in
automobile retailing, where interest rates rise sharply if vehicles are not sold within a 
specified time. In both cases, the penalties of shifting from one price regime to another 
provide significant incentives to avoid crossing the threshold that has been negotiated. By 
contrast, until recent decades consumers were usually only offered multipart tariffs that 
included discounts for buying in bulk. Such tariffs were not potentially ruinous, although 
consumers might experience opportunity losses due to being insufficiently alert or failing to 
plan far enough ahead to make the most of quantity discounts. However, more recently
consumers have started facing multipart tariffs that involve upward shifts in price regime if 
their usage exceeds specified threshold levels. This paper focuses on the capacity of 
consumers to deal with the most common of these, namely, connection service contracts for 
mobile (cell) phones.
Consumers generally find choosing mobile connection services exhausting and 
distressing (Harrison et al., 2011) and apparently more complex than decisions involving 
health insurance and retirement choices (Fear, 2008). Increasing levels of complaints to 
consumer watchdogs demonstrate growing dissatisfaction with the telecommunications 
industry, and the mobile service industry in particular (Telecommunications Industry 
Ombudsman, 2012; Bright, 2000). If one accepts that consumers suffer from bounded 
rationality, it is easy to see why this area is so problematic. When choosing a mobile phone 
service plan, consumers face not just a large array of options, but also difficulties in ranking 
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them.1 There are different categories of usage (e.g. calls, data, and various messaging 
services) all generally priced at different rates. Further pricing complications involve call 
connection fees, different prices for on- and off-network calls and for calls at different times 
of day (e.g. peak hours), and different billing increments (e.g. 30 seconds or 1 second). The 
multiple-part tariffs are such that a fixed fee buys some “included value” (typically a multiple 
of the fee), which can be used on a whole range of included usage categories. On reaching the 
limit (or “cap”), overage rates apply. However, the consumer is not presented with an explicit 
statement about the difference in above-cap and below-cap prices, which may be ten-fold or 
even more.
In the context of mobile phone contracts, multipart tariffs with increasing usage costs 
have no beneficial role to play for suppliers and customers alike by smoothing out peak-load 
spikes and keeping fixed costs down. Instead they appear to be a means of extracting 
consumer surplus, either at the expense of consumers who under-estimate their usage or by 
nudging consumers into making inefficiently large monthly commitments for fear of “going 
over the cap” and ending up with even bigger monthly charges.2
Spectacular examples of “bill shock” that provide the basis for stories in the consumer 
protection media tend to focus on the “fine print” aspect of these contracts. They do not 
concentrate on the more basic issue of whether consumers have the capacity to cope with 
these kinds of multipart pricing schemes in everyday contexts in which they have a good idea 
of their patterns of use and are not being snared by contractual clauses that normally they do 
not bring into operation. It is this latter issue that we explore in this paper. 
                                               
1 We use the term “plan” loosely to include prepaid options, as well as postpaid (contract) customers.
2 As such, they are another example of how firms might design their pricing strategies to exploit consumer 
bounded rationality (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Ellison and Ellison, 2009).
Grubb (2009) shows how multipart tariffs with increasing marginal usage costs are profit maximizing when 
consumers are overconfident regarding the precision of their usage forecast.
Page 5 of 42
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
5
Specifically, we use economics experiments to study how multipart tariffs affect the 
quality of consumer decisions in the context of choosing mobile phone service plans. We 
study three common types of pricing scheme that differ in the computational challenges they 
entail. The first is a relatively simple pay-as-you-go pricing scheme where you are charged 
only when using a service and thus there is no minimum monthly fee. This is akin to either a 
fully post-paid contract or to a pre-paid option where the unused credit never expires. The 
second, moderately complex, scheme involves paying an upfront fee each period that 
purchases a “value” of services equal to the fee paid, with any usage after this value has been 
exhausted being charged at the same rate as those used before the upfront value is exhausted. 
Any unused value expires at the end of each period. The third, and most complex, entails an 
upfront fee each period that purchases a value of services that is some multiple (greater than 
one) of the fee. As with the previous level of complexity, usage after this value has been 
exhausted is charged at the same rate as usage before the upfront value is exhausted. The 
difference, however, is that because the value is some multiple of the fee, overage rates 
exceed those within the value.3 Again, any unused value expires at the end of the period.
These three levels of pricing complexity allow us to identify which aspects of 
multipart pricing (e.g. the use of monthly fees or values that exceed fees) are the most
problematic for consumers. The second aspect we vary is uncertainty in usage. By 
considering the clearly unrealistic case of certain usage, we can isolate the cognitive 
difficulties that arise with complex pricing regimes. Finally, our design abstracts from the 
search process by providing participants with only seven plans to choose from. This reduces
the likelihood that any suboptimal decisions we observe result from “choice overload” (e.g. 
Agnew and Szykman, 2005; Besedes et al., 2012; Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al.,
                                               
3 For example, if a fee of $250 buys value of 750, usage beyond what has been paid for upfront is charged at 
three times the rate of those charged against the 750 value.
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2004; Scheibehenne et al., 2010). The task is thus reduced to a computational exercise, and 
subjects are provided with calculators.
Yet, despite all this stripping back of the choice problem, we find that subjects have
difficulty coping with multipart tariffs even after many rounds of feedback. The effects of 
pricing complexity however are subtle and not monotonic. Indeed our main finding is that 
simply eliminating the fee and included value structure does not necessarily lead to better 
decisions. Rather it is multipart tariffs with included values in excess of monthly fees, thus 
entailing two-tier pricing structures with increasing marginal costs, which are most difficult 
to handle and lead to the worst decisions.
Our results add significant ammunition to policy debates that center on claims that the 
telecommunications industry is a confusopoly, i.e., “a group of companies with similar 
products who intentionally confuse customers instead of competing on price” (Adams, 
1997).4 Such a view is supported by the following statement from Theresa Gattung, former 
CEO of Telecom New Zealand, who said “[t]hink about pricing. What has every telco in the 
world done in the past? It’s used confusion as its chief marketing tool.”5 What we show in 
this paper is that multipart tariffs that involve caps and penalty rates are quite sufficient to 
cause confusion on a large scale, even if consumers do not face information overload or 
opportunistic contractual ploys, and particularly so when usage rates are subject to variance.
We also find a strong link between financial numeracy regarding phone pricing and 
the quality of choices, with many participants lacking basic knowledge despite having their 
own mobile phones. These results contribute to a growing literature on more general financial 
literacy, which links lack of knowledge to poor financial choices (Banks and Oldfield, 2007; 
Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; van Rooij et al., 2011; Hastings et al., 2012).
                                               
4 Spiegler (2006), Carlin (2009), and Carlin and Manso (2011) develop theoretical models of price obfuscation. 
Of particular relevance, Piccione and Spiegler (2012) model how firms might choose to frame prices to make 
comparisons harder for consumers.
5 Available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/technology/news/article.cfm?c_id=5&objectid=10380894.
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Regulators have historically focused on enhancing competition in the supply side of 
markets such as the telecommunications industry, and more recently, through information 
provision policies. Our results suggest two different possible approaches; prohibiting 
multipart tariff structures with increasing marginal costs, and assisting consumers to 
understand exactly how the pricing scheme works.
Existing experimental work has demonstrated how other aspects of complexity such 
as increasing the number of options (Agnew and Szykham, 2005; Schram and Sonnemans, 
2011; Besedes et al., 2012) reduces decision quality. These negative effects of complexity
can persist even in simulated market environments (Kalayci and Potters, 2011; Sitzia and 
Zizzo, 2011). Others have studied how different kinds of pricing complexity and obfuscation 
such as price partitioning (Morwitz et al. 1998; Morwitz et al. 2013) and shrouding (Brown et 
al., 2010; Chetty et al., 2009) affect decision quality. None of these papers study multipart 
tariffs. In the closest work to ours, Sitzia et al. (forthcoming) investigate how non-linear 
tariffs and inattention affect choices in service markets like electricity and gas. Their design
is very different from ours, involving only one category of usage, no usage uncertainty, and 
much simpler non-linear tariffs.6 Importantly, their multipart tariffs involve decreasing 
marginal prices.
The shortcomings of real world consumers have also been documented in a variety of 
contexts, such as choosing products that differ in energy efficiency (Larrick and Soll, 2008;
Allcott, 2011) and even mobile phone plans (Grubb, 2009; Grubb, 2015; Grubb and Osborne, 
2015). In contrast to our work, these papers focus on consumer misperceptions such as 
overconfidence regarding the precision of their usage forecast (Grubb, 2009) and inattention 
                                               
6 The most complex tariff in Sitzia et al. (forthcoming) has two price tiers and a ceiling where the second tier 
begins. In contrast, the non-linear tariffs in our design involve an “included value” that can be used for seven 
different types of usage, where each usage type has a separate marginal cost.
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to past usage (Grubb, 2015; Grubb and Osborne, 2015) rather than the complex computations 
associated with multiple-part tariffs. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. We describe our experimental design in the next 
section. Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 concludes with a summary of our results and 
discussion of policy implications.
2. Experimental Design
2.1 Basic Environment
In order to study how price complexity and usage uncertainty affect decisions, we 
developed a stylized mobile phone plan choice environment in which participants had to 
choose one of seven possible mobile phone plans. We asked them to imagine they had just 
arrived in a foreign country and needed to choose a phone plan. They already had a suitable 
mobile phone that would work on the country’s mobile networks. All prices were given in the 
foreign currency, experimental dollars ($E). Prices were provided for six usage types: 
standard voice calls (price per 30 second block or part, and call connection fee), retrieving 
voicemail (price per 30 second block or part), standard domestic text messages (SMS), 
domestic picture texts (MMS), international text messages (SMS), and data usage (price per 
MB). In addition, plans may have a minimum monthly fee and included value. A sample 
decision screen is shown in Figure 1.7
Subjects were given a usage profile, which specified their exact usage of the phone 
each period as detailed in Table 1. Subjects were instructed that they would not be using the 
phone for any purpose other than those described. In half of the treatments, usage was certain 
while the other half faced uncertain usage in two components - number of calls and data 
usage. Our choice of the usage amounts was guided by several principles. First, phone calls 
and data would be the largest and hence most important components of usage to correspond 
                                               
7 Experimental instructions are contained in the appendix.
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with actual usage patterns. Second, the exact length of a call would include a partial 30-
second block to check understanding of the pricing schemes.8
In the uncertain treatments, the number of calls and data usage can be either low or 
high, with the expected usage set equal to usage in the certain case. Low usage was the most 
common outcome, with high calls occurring 20% of the time and high data 10% of the time. 
We carefully described the nature of the uncertainty to the subjects, explaining how their 
actual usage would be determined, after they had chosen an option, by an independent 
random draw from a uniform distribution. We chose to introduce uncertainty in only the two
most important usage components, and in a simple form rather than a more complicated 
distribution, so as not to totally overwhelm subjects yet still enable us to capture an important 
aspect of decisions.9
Subjects chose a mobile phone plan in each of 20 periods with their cost of usage each 
period deducted from their account balance. The available plans and usage profile remained 
constant across the 20 periods, although actual usage potentially varied across periods for 
those with uncertain usage. To avoid any ordering effects, the plan order was 
counterbalanced across participants. Each plan was given a neutral (tree) name to assist with 
identification.
Subjects begin the task with an opening account balance of $E1,500 and receive an 
additional $E500 in every period, including the first. From this account balance is deducted 
the cost of the plan they choose in each period. The initial balance provides a buffer in the 
event that the plan cost exceeds the period income, which can occur if an expensive option is 
                                               
8 Since phone calls are priced in 30-second blocks or parts thereof, a 75-second call uses three such blocks. This 
design is in part motivated from a survey we conducted of the general Australian population where less than half 
(42% of more than 1000 respondents) could correctly compute the cost of a call, with the most common error 
(21%) being omission of the last call block.
9 Clearly our uncertain usage profile still abstracts from reality, nevertheless excessive usage is a common cause 
of “bill shock”, especially unexpectedly high data usage. In addition, users may adjust their usage depending on 
the plan they choose. Since our experiment is already complex we chose not to introduce this further 
component. Instead, we focus on whether subjects understand complex pricing schemes.
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chosen and data usage is high in the uncertain case. Bankruptcy is a possibility, in which case 
subjects receive zero earnings from the phone choice task.
In each round, subjects were given 2.5 minutes to make a choice. This enables us to 
see whether subjects employ particular simplifying decision rules (e.g. choose the lowest fee 
option), which is more likely in pressured situations. There were no practice rounds, although 
detailed instructions were provided, and subjects answered a series of five quiz questions to 
check whether they understood the instructions.10 To encourage choices even under pressure, 
a penalty of $E600 (plus loss of per-round income) was imposed for initial failure to make a 
choice. Once a subject has chosen a particular plan, this plan is pre-selected as the default 
plan for them in subsequent rounds should they fail to choose within the available time. Thus 
only initial failure to choose is penalized. After each round, subjects were provided with
feedback regarding the actual cost of their chosen plan, as well as actual usage in the case of 
uncertain demand, and their updated account balance. Subjects were provided with a simple 
calculator, and pen and paper to assist during the experiment.
We chose to use natural language to describe the task, using the terminology of 
mobile phone plans. Although natural language could result in subjects using real world rules
or bringing existing knowledge to the task, we preferred this to framing the experiment using 
completely neutral language, which would make the task very abstract. In addition, any 
potential effect should be constant across treatments and thus treatment differences should be 
unaffected.
2.2 Pricing Complexity
To study how complex multiple-part tariffs affect decision quality we developed three 
different treatments. In all three treatments, prices were given for the six different usage types 
                                               
10 Because of our focus on cognition and literacy, and a desire to understand how complexity affects real world 
decision makers, we did not give explicit instructions on how to compute the cost of making a call or the cost of 
using a particular plan, etc. This corresponds with the information provided by real world providers. However, 
note that all of our subjects have mobile phones.
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described earlier. In the Simple treatment, both the monthly fee and included value are set 
equal to zero. In the Moderate treatment there is a monthly fee with an identical included 
value. In the Hard treatment, the included value is a multiple (greater than one) of the 
monthly fee. The treatment labels reflect the increasing number of considerations the subject 
needs to make.
Our motivation for these treatments is as follows. Simple pricing is like a pay-as-you-
go option and the issue is whether subjects can compute the cost correctly. The Moderate
pricing treatment adds a monthly fee, which entitles the user to an included value equal to the 
fee (and is thus specified in dollars rather than a number of units as in a standard three-part 
tariff) that can be used for any type of phone usage. With Moderate pricing, an additional 
step is required to determine the cost of the plan; usage costs have to be compared with the 
included value. Note that the price of usage over and under the included value is the same,
and thus subjects should not be concerned with exceeding the included value. Nevertheless,
people may be averse to going over the cap and so choose a more expensive plan with a 
higher included value. Alternatively, choosing a plan with a higher included value may 
provide greater certainty to those unable to do the necessary calculations, or the included 
amount may be construed as some kind of signal.11 The Hard pricing scheme adds several
additional complexities due to the included value being a multiple of the monthly fee. First, 
usage prices under and over the included value now differ, necessitating additional 
computations. Second, comparing across options is harder because simply comparing element 
prices means you are no longer comparing like with like.
Within these design issues, there is a wide range of options for prices, making it a 
non-trivial exercise to choose the prices in such a way as to maximize comparability (control) 
                                               
11 Our design cannot isolate these different reasons, although we ensured the best two plans never had the 
highest included value.
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across treatments. The first guiding principle we employed was to keep the same spread in 
the expected cost of the best and worst plans, and the best and second best plans across all 
treatments. In fact, these expected costs, and therefore the monetary incentives, were
approximately the same in all treatments. In particular, choosing the best option in all rounds 
of this task earned AUS$41.85 - $42.45 on average, the second best option earned AUS$8.30
- $9.11 less, and the worst option AUS$30.91 - 31.82 less.12 The second guiding principle 
was that the best two options would not be obvious to find by having the lowest call or data 
rate, or the highest included value or lowest fee.
Actual prices were kept the same in the Simple and Moderate treatments, and doubled 
in the Hard treatment thus maintaining consistency in relative prices. Monthly fees were kept 
the same across all treatments except for two plans with Uncertain usage where small
changes were needed to maintain a reasonable spread among the lower-ranked options. In the 
Hard treatments, included values were scaled up from those in the Moderate case to account 
for the higher usage prices. The screenshot in Figure 1 shows the prices used in the Uncertain 
Hard (UH) treatment. In other treatments, subjects saw the same screen but with (potentially) 
different price levels as just described. In the Simple treatments, the monthly fee and included 
value columns showed a value of zero, while in the Moderate treatments, the monthly fee and 
included value amounts were equal to each other.
An advantage of our design is that we can compute the best available plan and use this 
to assess the quality of decision making in the experiment. In the case of Certain usage this is 
unambiguous and this baseline treatment enables us to cleanly isolate the role that cognitive 
limitations and literacy play with regard to complex pricing schemes. Given the static 
environment, subjects should be able to complete these calculations, albeit after several 
                                               
12 At the time of the experiment, AUS$1US$1. In the Uncertain treatments, these amounts reflect expected 
earnings with actual earnings higher or lower depending on the actual, randomly determined, usage pattern of 
each subject.
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rounds or by trial-and-error. Failure to do so can be then attributed to cognitive limitations 
and misunderstandings. In the case of Uncertain usage, the best option is the one with the 
lowest expected cost. To check how risk preferences might affect these rankings we 
computed the expected utility associated with each option by employing the commonly used 
constant-relative risk aversion utility function. Regardless of risk preference, the top two 
plans always have the highest two expected utilities. When subjects are fairly risk averse, the 
ranking of the least risky option (the 5th ranked option) can increase in the UH treatment. In 
order to control for any possible such effects we collect a measure of risk preference to 
include as a control in our regressions.
2.3 Implementation
We employed a 3x2 treatment design over price complexity (Simple, Moderate, Hard) 
and usage uncertainty (Certain, Uncertain), with the six treatments described in Table 2, 
along with sample sizes. The experiments were run at the University of Queensland, 
Australia during early 2013 and involved 169 participants recruited from the general student 
population using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). There was one session per treatment, 
with treatments randomly allocated o the sessions. The experiment was fully computerized 
using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
The experiment was structured as follows. First, subjects answered a questionnaire 
containing standard demographic questions along with mobile phone usage questions.
Second, they participated in the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery choice task to provide a 
measure of risk preferences. This involves ten pairwise choices between two lotteries, one 
safe and one risky, with the switching point providing a measure of risk preference. Third,
came the 20 rounds of the phone choice task, which began after answering five quiz questions 
designed to check understanding of the instructions. Fourth, subjects answered some final 
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questions including three questions designed to test understanding of how mobile phone plan 
costs are computed from which we construct a measure of financial literacy.
Earnings were comprised of three parts: a $5 participation fee, earnings from one 
randomly selected decision from the ten lottery choices (determined at the end), and the final 
account balance from the phone choice task converted into Australian dollars at the rate of 
$E80 for $AUS1. Average total earnings for the 90-minute experiment were AUS$38.95, and 
ranged from $7 to $62.60.13
3. Results
We begin by summarizing the demographic characteristics of our participants, as well 
as literacy and risk preferences, as they may influence the quality of decisions. Summary 
statistics for all variables are provided in Table 3. We then analyze two measures of decision 
quality, the proportion of best choices, and the efficiency of choices. Unless stated otherwise,
all p-values are from Mann-Whitney tests of treatment differences, where the unit of analysis 
is each subject’s average measure of quality across the relevant time period. We defer 
discussion of possible reasons for our findings to the final subsection.
3.1 Participant Characteristics and Literacy
Participants were university students, predominantly undergraduates (90%), and 
slightly more than half were male (57%). None had previously participated in a similar 
experiment. Nearly half speak another language at home (49%), and only 41% were locally
born. These factors might affect familiarity with phone pricing. About three-quarters (76%)
had or were currently taking an economics course at the university, which might reflect 
general numeracy. All subjects had a mobile phone; however, nearly one-quarter (24%) 
                                               
13 Two subjects went bankrupt in the phone task (one in US and one in UH) and earned only the participation fee 
plus their earnings in the risk task. Their decisions prior to bankruptcy are included in the analysis. After going 
bankrupt, they made no more decisions. Both of the bankrupt subjects failed to choose in period 1, and went 
bankrupt in periods 11 and 13, respectively. While both received a number of high usage periods of either calls 
or data, it was a period where both were high that finally sunk them, combined with choosing a bad plan.
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indicated that they did not pay for the bill themselves, perhaps suggesting less familiarity 
with financial decisions. Of the remainder, there was a roughly equal split between those on 
prepaid and postpaid options.
In the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery choice task, subjects make ten pairwise choices 
between two lotteries, one safe and one risky. The number of safe lottery choices provides a 
measure of risk preference with the distribution of this measure shown in Figure 2. Four safe 
choices indicates risk neutrality (20% of participants), with only 5% risk loving (making 2 or 
3 safe choices) and the remaining 76% displaying varying degrees of risk aversion, with most
making 5-7 safe choices.
To study the role of financial literacy we asked participants three multiple-choice 
phone service pricing questions at the end of the experiment.14 In all questions, usage is much 
simpler than in the experiment, comprising only a certain number of calls and text messages.
The first question involves computing the cost of a single phone call lasting 2 minutes and 34 
seconds, thus involving a partial 30-second block. Only 60% of participants answered 
correctly, while 20% omitted the connection fee and 12% omitted the last 30-second block.
The second and third questions involve three-part tariff pricing, but simplified the 
calculation by having each call exactly the same length as the pricing increment (one minute)
to isolate mistakes related to the tariff structure from the misunderstandings demonstrated in 
question 1.15 In the second question, the cost of usage is under the included value, thus you 
only pay the monthly fee. However, only half of the participants knew this (49%), while 38% 
thought they had to pay the full usage cost. In the third question, usage cost exceeds the 
                                               
14 The questions are shown in the appendix. Given that these questions are asked after the subjects had 
completed the 20 rounds of the experiment, experience in the experiment may influence responses. However, 
while the feedback provided each round detailed the cost of the plan chosen by the subject, there was no specific 
feedback on how that was computed, so this influence was likely small. In addition, literacy varies in a 
meaningful manner across subjects, and both literacy and experience are significant influences on decision 
quality when usage is uncertain.
15 Omitting the connection fee will affect the usage cost but since usage remains under the included value the 
answer remains the same in question 2.
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included value, so the amount you pay equals the monthly fee plus the cost of excess usage. 
Only 25% knew this while 44% thought they had to pay the full usage costs. These responses 
show a serious misunderstanding of three-part tariff pricing schemes, which are very 
common, particularly with postpaid plans.16
Overall, only 18% of participants answered all three questions correctly. Disturbingly,
one-quarter got none correct, while 37% answered only one question correctly, and 22% two 
questions. Those on postpaid options answered 1.5 questions correctly on average compared 
to only 1.1 correct answers for those on prepaid options, a marginally significant difference
(p-value = 0.09; Mann-Whitney test). A simple linear regression of the number of correct 
answers on a prepaid indicator, along with demographic and phone use characteristics,
confirms this difference with a significant negative coefficient on prepaid users while no 
other characteristics were significant.
3.2 Proportion of Best Choices by Treatment
The first measure of decision quality that we consider is the proportion of best 
choices, where the best choice is defined as the cheapest option for the given usage profile or 
in the case of Uncertain usage, the lowest expected cost.17 We control for the influence of 
risk preferences later in this section. 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of best choices in each period by treatment, while 
Table 4 shows the average value over each quarter of the experiment and overall. With
Certain usage, subjects learn to find the best plan with around 70% of them making the best 
choice by period 20, although learning took longer with Hard pricing. In contrast, with 
                                               
16 It is possible that participants misunderstood the questions despite our careful wording which explicitly asked,
“what will you have to pay for using this plan” and emphasized “minimum monthly fee”. Further, these 
questions were not incentivized. Yet subjects had the option to choose “not sure”, although very few did.
17 In period 1, 28 people failed to make a choice and were thus penalized but no one did in period 2. As there are 
no apparent differences across treatments, we do not consider this further.
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Uncertain usage, the proportion of best choices rises only slowly over time, with learning 
slowest with Simple pricing. By period 20 only one-third of subjects find the best plan.
Averaging over all subjects, pricing treatments, and periods, in the Certain treatments 
50% of choices were the best compared with only 27% with Uncertain usage (p-
value<0.001). As illustrated in Figure 3, this treatment difference takes some periods to 
emerge. In particular, during Periods 1-5 while Certain results in a greater proportion of best 
choices, the difference is not statistically significant in any price treatment. From the second 
quarter on, a clear significant difference emerges between Certain and Uncertain in the 
Simple and Moderate treatments (p-values<0.001 in each quarter and overall). In the Hard
treatment however, a significant difference only emerges in Periods 16-20 (p-value=0.03). 
Hard pricing seems to slow down learning in the Certain usage cases. 
The effect of pricing complexity is less clear, although by period 20 Moderate pricing 
leads to the highest proportion of best choices in both usage treatments. Since the effect of 
pricing complexity appears to differ across the usage treatments, we analyze the two cases 
separately. With Certain usage, the proportion of best choices is always highest with 
Moderate pricing, and is significantly different from Hard pricing in all except the last 
quarter (p-values of 0.08, <0.01, <0.01, 0.12 in the four quarters respectively), but only
significantly different from Simple in the first two quarters (p-values of 0.07, 0.06, 0.52, 0.68 
in the four quarters respectively). Thus, when usage is Certain, Moderate pricing appears
easier for inexperienced subjects to navigate. In contrast, with Uncertain usage, Moderate
and Hard do equally well (p-values of 0.30, 0.52, 0.86, 0.80 in the four quarters respectively) 
while Simple pricing leads to significantly fewer top choices than Hard in the first half of the 
experiment only (p-values of 0.02, 0.05, 0.18, 0.58 in the four quarters, respectively). Thus, 
with Uncertain usage, Simple pricing seems more prone to result in inexperienced consumers 
making errors than the multipart tariff schemes.
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In order to control for learning over time and demographic differences, we ran Probit 
panel random effects regressions where the dependent variable is a binary indicator of 
whether the best plan was chosen or not. We have twenty observations for each person, 
except for the two bankrupt subjects where we only have data until they went bankrupt. 
Explanatory variables include Period and indicator variables for the treatments (Uncertain, 
Moderate, Hard). Demographic control variables include indicators for gender (Male), 
whether the subject was born locally (Local Born), having taken an economics course (Econ
Course), participating in first experiment (First Exp), and being a first-year student (First
Year). We also included two experimentally collected measures: the number of safe lottery 
choices as a measure of risk preference (Num Safe Choices), and the number of correctly 
answered phone literacy questions (Num Correct Literacy).
In Table 5 we report the coefficient estimates using the whole dataset (ALL) and then 
separated by the usage treatments (U and C).18 For each set of data, we report two 
specifications: first just using experimental control variables (models A) and then using all of 
the regressor variables (models B). Not surprisingly, we find significant evidence of learning 
over time with the coefficient on Period significantly positive in all specifications. Uncertain
usage significantly reduces the likelihood of choosing the best option (Model ALL-A), and 
continues to do so even after controlling for differences in risk preferences and other 
demographic factors (Model ALL-B). Across both usage treatments, Moderate pricing leads 
to better decisions, which is consistent with our earlier findings.
With Uncertain usage, Simple pricing does significantly worse than either Moderate
or Hard (which have approximately the same positive coefficient in Model U-A), consistent 
with earlier findings. Once we add the controls, however, we have the surprising conclusion 
                                               
18 The whole dataset enables us to check the robustness of the results regarding usage uncertainty. Because 
Figure 3 and the associated statistics suggest that the effect of price complexity differs across the usage 
treatments, we estimate separate models for Certain and Uncertain. We prefer this approach to using interaction 
terms in the regressors because of the challenge of interpretation in Probit models (Ai and Norton, 2003).
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that Hard pricing significantly increases likelihood of choosing the best plan. Locally-born 
subjects, those who had taken an economics course, or with experience in experiments
(although of a different type) made better choices. More risk averse subjects were less likely 
to select the best option, perhaps preferring less risky options or being more prone to 
overweight the low-probability, high call/high data outcomes, as would be expected from 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Those with greater phone numeracy did 
significantly better. The results are different for Certain usage, where there is no significant 
price treatment effect until we add demographics, after which we find that Moderate does 
best, as do male subjects, and, bizarrely, more risk averse subjects. These results are robust to 
alternative regressor sets such as including measures of phone usage and additional 
demographic variables, none of which were significant and neither did the results change.19
Finally, we summarize our main results from this section. First, across all the 
statistics, Uncertain usage significantly decreases the probability of choosing the best phone 
plan even after controlling for differences in risk preferences and other demographic factors.
Result 1A (Usage Uncertainty): Uncertain usage significantly decreases the likelihood of 
choosing the best phone plan regardless of the degree of price complexity.
Second, the impact of pricing complexity is more subtle, differing across the usage 
treatments as well as being sensitive to the time period (from the univariate statistics) and 
model used. Thus, we can draw only tentative conclusions. One commonality however, is 
that Simple pricing never leads to the highest likelihood of finding the best option and 
performs especially poorly when usage is uncertain.
                                               
19 Our results are also robust to excluding the decisions of subjects in the Uncertain treatments who were getting 
close to bankruptcy (94 decisions), which we define as having an opening account balance less than or equal to 
E$1,000. Those with a balance less than E$1,000 were at risk of bankruptcy in the unlikely event of having both 
high calls and high data in a period and choosing poorly, resulting in period losses of up to E$842 in UH, and up 
to E$441 in US and UM. The behavior of subjects may change as they get close to bankruptcy, especially as the 
downside risk is limited to zero. The risk of bankruptcy in the Certain treatments is minimal, as the maximum 
per round loss is only E$30. Indeed the lowest opening account balance was E$853.
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Result 2A (Price Complexity): Simple, pay-as-you-go, pricing schemes significantly reduce 
the likelihood of choosing the best phone plan compared to more complex multiple-part 
tariffs, particularly when usage is uncertain.
Third, phone numeracy was also a significant determinant of best choices in 
Uncertain, while those with local knowledge or economics courses also did better. These
results suggest that it is not pricing complexity per se that leads to lower quality decisions, 
but rather an inability to deal with uncertainty, even of a well-defined and simple type. Those 
who have taken an economics course are perhaps more proficient at dealing with and 
understanding uncertainty. Further, while learning occurs over time due to experience and 
feedback, our results suggest that other types of learning or knowledge are equally important;
specifically, understanding how phone pricing works. Each additional question answered 
correctly increases the likelihood of choosing the best option by 8 percentage points (average 
marginal effect in model U-B) compared with the average learning effect per period of 1 
percentage point.20 In the certain case, since subjects can try out plans and learn with less 
risk, the effect of numeracy is dampened.
Result 3A (Learning & Literacy): When usage is uncertain, both phone literacy and task 
experience improve decision making.
3.3 Decision Efficiency
Since considering only best choices may be restrictive, we construct an alternative 
measure of decision quality that accounts for the variety of other options chosen as well as 
the costliness of mistakes. Specifically, for each decision in every period, we compute the 
following measure: Efficiency = (Expected Cost of the Worst Option - Expected Cost of the 
Chosen Option) / (Expected Cost of the Worst Option - Expected Cost of the Best Option). 
                                               
20 These figures are merely illustrative of the fact that improving literacy might have a substantial (as well as 
statistically significant) impact on choices. Clearly, the effect of learning is expected to diminish over time. 
Similarly, some types of knowledge may be more helpful than others.
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This measure ranges from 0 if the most costly option is selected to 1 if the best (cheapest)
option is selected. Intermediate values reflect the proportion of the possible efficiency gain 
captured by the subject’s choice. Thus, the higher the measure, the better the quality of the 
decision is.
Figure 4 shows efficiency averaged over participants in each period by treatment, 
while Table 6 shows the average value over each quarter of the experiment, as well as 
overall. As is evident from the figure, Uncertain usage leads to less efficient decisions with 
the treatment effect highly significant with Simple and Moderate pricing from the second 
quarter onwards and overall (p-values<0.001), and with Hard pricing from the third quarter
onwards and overall (p-values<0.03). Thus, again learning is slower in CH.
With respect to price complexity, efficiency yields clearer results. Specifically, in 
both Certain and Uncertain, Hard pricing leads to less efficient choices. In Certain, this 
effect is present right from the first quarter, with Hard leading to significantly less efficient 
choices than both Simple and Moderate in all quarters and overall. However, the difference 
lessens with experience (p-values≤0.01 in the first three quarters and overall; in the final 
quarter p-value=0.07 comparing Moderate and Hard, and p-value=0.12 comparing Simple
and Hard). The complexity effect takes longer to emerge with Uncertain usage, with 
significant differences between Moderate and Hard (p-value=0.03) and Simple and Hard (p-
value=0.05) only emerging in the last quarter. No significant differences are detected between 
Simple and Moderate in any quarter or usage treatment.
We also conduct random effects panel regressions with efficiency as the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variables as described earlier. Results from specifications
identical to Table 5 are provided in Table 7. Uncertain usage leads to less efficient decisions 
and, as expected, there is a strong learning effect. The results clearly show that Hard pricing 
leads to less efficient (more costly) decisions than either Simple or Moderate pricing, with a 
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highly significant negative coefficient across all specifications. There is never a significant 
difference between Simple and Moderate. Those with an economics course continue to make 
better decisions, as do those with greater phone literacy, especially with uncertain usage.21, 22
The findings that Hard pricing leads to lower quality decisions and that Simple and 
Moderate pricing lead to equally efficient decisions are consistent with findings in the 
univariate tests reported above. We compare these results with those in the previous section 
and explore possible reasons in the following section. 
 We summarize our first two results as follows:
Result 1B (Usage Uncertainty): Uncertain usage significantly decreases the efficiency of 
phone plan choices regardless of the degree of price complexity.
Result 2B (Price Complexity): Hard pricing significantly decreases the efficiency of phone 
plans choices compared to either Simple or Moderate pricing schemes regardless of whether 
usage is certain or not. Simple and Moderate pricing schemes lead to equally efficient 
choices.
Finally note that as in the previous section both task experience and phone literacy 
significantly increase the efficiency of decisions.
Result 3B (Learning & Literacy): When usage is uncertain, both phone literacy and task 
experience improve decision making.
3.4 Additional Analysis and Explanations
Since the results regarding price complexity are somewhat mixed, in this section we 
explore our findings further. We place heavier weight on the results using decision efficiency 
                                               
21 These results are also robust to excluding the decisions of subjects in the Uncertain treatments who were 
getting close to bankruptcy, as described in footnote 19.
22 We also constructed an alternative measure that computes the efficiency of choices relative to choosing 
randomly (i.e. compared to the average expected cost across all available plans). This measure also takes a value 
of 1 when choosing optimally, but can be negative if a very poor choice is made. The results are similar to those 
reported here, except that the coefficient on Hard in the Uncertain treatment is only significant at the 10% level.
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as the measure of quality both because these findings are more robust and because the 
broader measure of decision quality is more policy relevant than the analysis of best choices.
One common and surprising finding for both measures of decision quality is that what 
we called Simple pricing did not necessarily lead to better decisions compared to Moderate
pricing. The immediate implication is that it is not multipart tariffs per se that are difficult to 
navigate. On the other hand, while Hard pricing lessened decision efficiency it did not always 
lower the likelihood of choosing the best option; in fact, according to the results in Model U-
b it had the opposite effect. One possible interpretation is that while Hard pricing results in 
skilled subjects having a higher probability of finding the best option, it also results in 
substantially worse choices for those who miss the best one, and indeed this must be 
sufficient to outweigh the best choice effect. The results from the efficiency measure imply 
that multipart tariffs with increasing usage costs are the most problematic for consumers.
First, we explore why Simple and Moderate pricing performed similarly. Recall that 
Simple pricing is not that simple at all, but only relative to the other treatments. Specifically, 
the only difference is whether the plan includes a monthly fee. While there is no minimum 
monthly fee with Simple pricing, subjects still had to compute the cost of six different usage 
types, including phone calls where costs involve both a connection fee and per-minute
charge, and add these up. When designing the experiment we believed that the inclusion of a 
monthly fee would make decisions more complex. Instead, perhaps a fee gives subjects an 
amount to focus on even if they cannot do the calculations. For example, if they are trying to 
work out the calculations roughly in their heads, they may find this easier to do in terms of 
their working memory by subtraction from the reference point provided by the fee, rather 
than adding up the various components with zero as a reference point.
An alternative explanation is that the more complex pricing schemes evoke “slow 
thinking” judgment techniques of the deliberate, analytical kind, while subjects employ more 
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intuitive “quick thinking” when pricing appears (deceptively) simple (Kahneman, 2011). This 
effect might have been enhanced because the instructions for all pricing treatments listed the 
same usage categories, which included a monthly fee and included value. Subjects may 
therefore have been pleasantly surprised to find no fee and included value in the Simple
treatments.
Anecdotal evidence on how subjects perceived the task comes from responses during 
the final questionnaire regarding “how easy or difficult you found making the decision of the 
phone plan”. We grouped responses into three categories: very or fairly easy, neither easy or 
difficult, and fairly or very difficult.23 As expected, subjects found the task more difficult
with Uncertain usage, with 30% finding the task very or fairly difficult compared to only 
18% with Certain usage (Mann-Whitney p-value=0.066). Disaggregating by pricing 
treatment, with Certain usage only 7% of subjects found the task fairly or very difficult with 
Simple pricing, compared to 21% and 28% with Moderate and Hard, respectively (the 
difference between Simple and Hard is significant; p-value=0.034). With Certain usage then,
the label “Simple” aligns with subject perceptions, providing indicative evidence in support 
of the “quick thinking” explanation. On the other hand, with Uncertain usage subjects 
perceived no difference across the pricing treatments: 28% of subjects found the task difficult 
with Moderate pricing, compared to 30% in the Simple and 33% in the Hard. The difficulty 
of dealing with uncertain usage seems to swamp these other considerations.24
To further understand the treatment differences we constructed a measure of the 
number of unique plans each subject chose during the 20 periods. Subjects try significantly 
fewer plans in the Uncertain treatments (average 4.59 vs. 4.17, p-value=0.03, Mann-Whitney 
                                               
23 There were five options on the response scale but only seven subjects selected the extremes.
24 A third possible explanation is that subjects may be less familiar with Simple schemes given their real world 
experience. However, as mentioned in Section 3.2, our results are robust to the inclusion of additional regressors 
such as whether subjects are on prepaid or postpaid plans. Simple schemes are more common with prepaid 
plans.
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test) perhaps because the potential consequences of a mistake are higher. We also checked 
whether subjects had even tried the best plan or not, classifying subjects into one of four 
possible groups: never tried the best plan, tried the best plan but did not lock on, locked on to 
the best plan during periods 1-10, and locked on during periods 11-20. “Locking on” is 
defined as choosing the best plan and never deviating in any subsequent period. For example, 
if a subject chose the best plan in periods 8, 11, and 13-20, they are considered to have 
“locked on” in period 13 and thus belong to the fourth group. The proportion of each type of 
subject is given in Table 8 disaggregated by treatment. 
A surprisingly high proportion of subjects never even try the best plan (28% averaged 
across all treatments). In the Certain treatments, people that try the best option almost always 
lock on to that plan indicating their confidence in that decision. In contrast, with Uncertain
usage, one-third of subjects (averaged across all treatments) tried the best option but switched 
away. As expected, finding the best option takes longer when usage is uncertain. Uncertain
usage therefore makes subjects more reluctant to try plans, and less confident in their choices.
Comparing within the Uncertain treatments, a staggering 50% of subjects never even try the 
best plan with Simple pricing, a proportion significantly higher than in either Moderate (p-
value=0.08) or Hard (p-value=0.03). In contrast, with Hard pricing subjects may try the best 
option but are significantly more likely to switch away after doing so than with Simple
pricing (p-value=0.03).25
Finally, our design enables us to investigate if subjects employed various decision 
rules. Recall that we ensured that the best two options never had the lowest call rate or lowest 
data cost or the highest included value or the lowest fee. In Table 9 we report the proportion 
                                               
25 Analysis of how often subjects changed their chosen option yields similar insights. Averaged across all 
treatments, around two-thirds of subjects switched plans in the early rounds, with this rate steadily declining to 
only 8% by the final round. In the early rounds, switching was actually higher with Certain usage than with 
Uncertain usage, consistent with a reluctance to try plans in the latter case. In the last round, 27% of subjects in 
the UH treatment changed their chosen option from that selected in the previous round. This compared to only 
10% in the US and UM treatments, zero in the CS and CM and only 3% in the CH.
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of subjects in each treatment that chose plans according to these decision rules for three 
periods during the experiment. In the Certain treatments, subjects appear to employ various 
decision rules in the initial rounds but learn over time, although this takes longer in CH. In
contrast, in the UH treatment there is limited learning, with the proportion of best choices 
very similar in all three periods. Indeed subjects are actually less likely to choose the best 
option in period 20 than in period 10 and instead are drawn to the plan with the highest 
included value, most likely to lessen the risk of going over the included value. Subjects in UH
appear to have little confidence in their ability to compute whether plans actually would take 
them over the cap, whereas those in UM seem less overwhelmed by the computational 
complexity and are more confident in their decisions. Interestingly, if subjects had simplified 
their calculations by ignoring the risks of high usage, they would have ended up picking the 
best plan, as this was the one that was cheapest for the highest probable state. However, given 
what is known from the research on heuristics and biases (Kahneman, and Tversky, 1979;
Kahneman, 2011), while some might have treated the high data/high calls state “as if” it had a 
zero probability, there could also have been attempts to apply the “law of small numbers” and 
try to predict which state would eventuate based on the run that had eventuated so far. 
Disappointing outcomes achieved in this way could help explain why there was a switch in 
favor of simply opting for the plan with the highest included value. These arguments provide 
some insight into why Hard pricing leads to worse overall decision quality.
4. Conclusion
Consumers are facing a marketplace with a proliferation of options and increasing 
complexity. In this paper, we study the quality of choices consumers make when faced with 
complex multipart tariffs with increasing marginal costs. Our results demonstrate that
consumers have difficulty with such pricing complexity, even in the best of settings and with 
mathematically competent subjects. Yet the effects of pricing complexity are subtle and not 
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monotonic. Indeed, our main finding is that simply eliminating the fee and included value
structure does not necessarily lead to better decisions. Rather it is multiple-part tariffs with 
included values in excess of monthly fees, thus entailing two-tier pricing structures with
increasing marginal costs, which are most difficult to handle and lead to the worse decisions.
Further, our results demonstrate the benefits of knowledge and experiential learning. 
With regard to consumer phone literacy, we found that not only were our subjects uneducated 
about how phone usage costs were computed, but that those who are informed make 
significantly better choices when usage is uncertain. This was true whether measured by best 
choices or the broader measure of cost efficiency. While experiential learning also improved 
decisions, it was less beneficial than improved consumer knowledge. 
In terms of potential policy implications, supply-side regulation might prohibit
multipart tariffs with increased marginal costs in the telecommunications industry, or more 
generally in sectors where there is no economic justification for such a structure. Demand-
side regulation might improve literacy since it is clear that many subjects do not understand 
basic pricing, especially with regard to included values, despite many being on such plans. 
One suggestion is for providers to make the two-tier nature of the pricing structure explicit to 
consumers rather than hiding behind the concept of “included value”. The challenge is how to 
do this effectively given the low literacy and numeracy levels in the general population; there 
is a risk of generating greater, rather than less, confusion. Although regulatory policies have
often favored increased information provision, the question remains whether these are 
effective substitutes or complements to financial literacy.26
In drawing policy conclusions, one must be aware of issues regarding external 
validity. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that with regard to phone literacy our student
                                               
26 In Australia, for example, providers must now provide a Critical Information Summary for every plan they 
offer, which must specify, among other things, the cost of a making a standard two minute call, as well as the 
number of standard two minute calls that can be made from the included value if used only for that purpose.
Page 28 of 42
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
28
subjects perform similarly to those in the general population.27 In particular, while 60% of 
students could calculate the call cost, 42% of our general survey respondents did. The figures 
were 49% for students versus 35% for the three-part tariff question with usage under the 
included value, and 25% correct for students versus 19% for usage over the included value. 
While students are typically smarter and more comfortable with numerical calculations than 
the general population, they also lack experience with complex financial decisions such as 
mortgages and retirement investments. Younger people are typically less financially literate 
and usually considered as vulnerable consumers in these complex markets.
Our stylized environment is much simpler than the real world where consumers have 
to search to discover what is available, with many more options, and where a lack of 
repetition and a non-static environment make learning more difficult. On the other hand, 
consumers are often locked into contracts for 1-2 years and the cost of switching to another 
provider or plan (even if not locked in) can be prohibitive. Thus, the consequences of 
mistaken choices will be higher in reality. Further, consumers do not have the opportunity to 
“try before you buy”, limiting learning in the first instance. However, consumers may have 
prior knowledge, access to comparison websites, and advice from family and friends, which 
might improve their decision making.
                                               
27 We used the same three financial literacy questions in a survey with over 1,000 respondents from the general 
Australian population. Details are available from the authors.
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Tables
Table 1: Usage Profile
Type of Usage Usage each perioda
Number of domestic phone calls made Certain: 100
Uncertain: 85 (p=0.8) or 160 (p=0.2)
Exact length of each domestic phone call 75 seconds
Number of domestic SMS (standard texts) sent 41
Number of domestic MMS (picture texts) sent 5
Number of international SMS (standard texts) sent 10
Number of voicemail retrievals 15
Exact length of each voicemail retrieval 120 seconds
Data usage (MB) Certain: 200
Uncertain: 161 (p=0.9) or 551 (p=0.1)
a p = probability of each usage alternative
Table 2: Treatment Design and Sample Sizes
Demand Uncertainty
Price Complexity CERTAIN UNCERTAIN
Simple CS - 30 US – 30
Moderate CM – 24 UM – 29
Hard CH - 29 UH - 27
Page 30 of 42
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
30
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable Description Mean Std 
Dev
Min Max
Period Period in the phone task 10.50 5.77 1 20
Uncertain Indicator of uncertain usage 
(1=Uncertain; 0 = Certain)
0.51 0.50 0 1
Moderate Indicator of moderate pricing 
(1=Moderate; 0 = Simple or Hard)
0.32 0.47 0 1
Hard Indicator of hard pricing (1= Hard; 0 = 
Simple or Moderate)
0.33 0.47 0 1
Male Indicator of male 0.57 0.50 0 1
Age Age in years 20.42 4.09 17 48
Local Born Indicator of locally born 0.41 0.49 0 1
Other Language Indicator if speaks other language at 
home
0.49 0.50 0 1
Econ Course Indicator of taking an economics 
course
0.76 0.43 0 1
First Exp Indicator of first experiment 0.69 0.47 0 1
First Year Indicator if first year student 0.40 0.49 0 1
Num Safe 
Choices
Number of safe lottery choices 5.66 1.56 2 10
Num Correct 
Literacy
Number of correct financial literacy 
questions
1.34 1.03 0 3
Chose Best Plan Indicator if chose best plan 0.39 0.49 0 1
Efficiency Efficiency = (expected cost of worst
option - expected cost of chosen 
option) / (expected cost of worst 
option – expected cost of best option)
0.73 0.28 0 1
Table 4: Proportion of Best Choices in Each Quarter and Overall
Certain Pricing Periods 
1-5
Periods 
6-10
Periods 
11-15
Periods 
16-20
Periods 
1-20
Certain Simple 0.16 0.47 0.70 0.73 0.52
Certain Moderate 0.28 0.65 0.80 0.85 0.64
Certain Hard 0.15 0.26 0.46 0.61 0.37
Uncertain Simple 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.19
Uncertain Moderate 0.19 0.26 0.39 0.37 0.30
Uncertain Hard 0.27 0.30 0.40 0.34 0.32
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Table 5: Probit Random Effects Results of Best Choice (Coefficients Reported)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Chose Best Plan = 1, Did Not Chose Best Plan = 0
ALL Treatments UNCERTAIN CERTAIN
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B
Period 0.1143*** 0.1142*** 0.0507*** 0.0503*** 0.2188*** 0.2186***
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Uncertain -1.0662*** -1.2813***
(0.2586) (0.2544)
Moderate 0.7086** 0.5916* 0.7206* 0.0568 0.8815 1.2299**
(0.3172) (0.3132) (0.3849) (0.3315) (0.5934) (0.5689)
Hard 0.1775 0.2741 0.8533** 0.6941** -0.7494 -0.3128
(0.3127) (0.3077) (0.3911) (0.3424) (0.5688) (0.5588)
Male 0.1363 -0.4992* 1.1211**
(0.2641) (0.3001) (0.4880)
Local Born -0.0283 0.5848** -0.7845
(0.2687) (0.2934) (0.4978)
Econ Course 0.7214** 1.6823*** 0.5757
(0.2995) (0.3876) (0.5363)
First Exp -0.9501*** -0.6773** -0.5390
(0.3082) (0.3280) (0.5879)
First Year 0.6621** 0.5262 0.3423
(0.2941) (0.3235) (0.5651)
0.0017 -0.1952** 0.3488**Num Safe
 Choices (0.0803) (0.0861) (0.1582)
0.2624** 0.3858*** -0.1605Num Correct
  Literacy (0.1228) (0.1168) (0.2547)
Constant -1.7005*** -2.1767*** -2.1794*** -2.3747*** -2.5897*** -5.0045***
(0.2627) (0.6290) (0.3001) (0.6525) (0.4212) (1.3200)
Observations 3364 3364 1704 1704 1660 1660
Subjects 169 169 86 86 83 83
Log likelihood -1338.56 -1329.02 -695.93 -679.19 -553.75 -547.49
Prob > Chisqa 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Coefficients reported. Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. Observations are missing after bankruptcy occurs for two subjects in Uncertain.
a Result of Wald test of model significance, degrees of freedom equal number of coefficients.
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Table 6: Average Efficiency in Each Quarter and Overall
Certain Pricing Periods 
1-5
Periods 
6-10
Periods 
11-15
Periods 
16-20
Periods 
1-20
Certain Simple 0.63 0.81 0.90 0.93 0.82
Certain Moderate 0.64 0.86 0.92 0.95 0.84
Certain Hard 0.53 0.68 0.79 0.88 0.72
Uncertain Simple 0.62 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.69
Uncertain Moderate 0.59 0.65 0.74 0.78 0.69
Uncertain Hard 0.55 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.62
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Table 7: Random Effects Results of Efficiency
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Efficiency
ALL Treatments UNCERTAIN CERTAIN
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B
Period 0.0155*** 0.0155*** 0.0104*** 0.0103*** 0.0208*** 0.0208***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Uncertain -0.1276*** -0.1411***
(0.0192) (0.0186)
Moderate 0.0108 0.0018 0.0023 -0.0477 0.0231 0.0387
(0.0219) (0.0241) (0.0334) (0.0351) (0.0276) (0.0270)
Hard -0.0855*** -0.0821*** -0.0694* -0.0863*** -0.0999*** -0.0786**
(0.0238) (0.0232) (0.0372) (0.0327) (0.0304) (0.0315)
Male 0.0194 -0.0205 0.0641***
(0.0189) (0.0266) (0.0223)
Local Born -0.0062 0.0120 -0.0285
(0.0202) (0.0319) (0.0238)
Econ Course 0.0576*** 0.1252*** 0.0283
(0.0207) (0.0348) (0.0272)
First Exp -0.0447** -0.0152 -0.0297
(0.0203) (0.0275) (0.0307)
First Year 0.0296 0.0287 0.0197
(0.0203) (0.0276) (0.0301)
-0.0020 -0.0219** 0.0195**Num Safe 
Choices (0.0068) (0.0090) (0.0079)
0.0274*** 0.0453*** -0.0074Num Correct 
Literacy (0.0093) (0.0120) (0.0112)
Constant 0.6553*** 0.6055*** 0.5799*** 0.5699*** 0.6009*** 0.4614***
(0.0208) (0.0525) (0.0250) (0.0700) (0.0236) (0.0698)
Observations 3336 3336 1690 1690 1646 1646
Subjects 169 169 86 86 83 83
Prob > Chisqa 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. Observations are missing after bankruptcy occurs for two subjects in Uncertain, as well as in 
period 1 for the 28 subjects who failed to choose.
a Result of Wald test of model significance, degrees of freedom equal number of coefficients.
Table 8: Classification of Types (percentage in each category)
CERTAIN UNCERTAIN
Type / Treatment Simple Moderate Hard Simple Moderate Hard
Never try best plan 27% 13 28 50 28 22
Try best plan but do 
not lock on
0 0 7 20 31 48
Lock on during 
periods 1-10
47% 46 24 7 7 15
Lock on during 
periods 11-20
27% 42 41 23 34 15
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Table 9: Percentage of Subjects Using Decision Rules by Treatment
CERTAIN USAGE UNCERTAIN USAGE
Simple Moderate Hard Simple Moderate Hard
PERIOD 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
Best plan 14 63 73 13 75 87 12 28 66 12 20 31 21 31 44 27 44 31
Lowest data cost 5 0 0 4 4 0 12 0 0 8 7 0 0 4 0 5 7 4
Lowest call cost 19 3 0 4 4 0 8 17 4 19 20 10 8 4 7 9 7 8
Highest included 
value
17 0 0 20 10 0 0 0 7 5 7 27
Lowest feea 4 0 0 28 3 0 17 4 0 18 0 8
Note: the percentage is computed over active choices only (i.e. excluding those who failed to choose a plan).
a = with Hard pricing the lowest fee option is also the highest value/fee plan
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Figure 1: Sample Decision Screen – Hard Pricing Treatment
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Figure 2: Number of Safe Lottery Choices in the Risk Elicitation Task
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Note: less than four safe lottery choices implies risk loving preferences, exactly four safe choices implies risk 
neutral preferences, more than four safe choices implies risk averse preferences.
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Figure 3: Proportion of Best Choices by Treatment
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f B
e
st
 C
h
o
ic
e
s
0 5 10 15 20
Period
Certain Simple
Certain Moderate
Certain Hard
Uncertain Simple
Uncertain Moderate
Uncertain Hard
Page 39 of 42
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Figure 4: Average Cost Efficiency by Treatment
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